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The rule of law, whether applied to matters trivial or grand, is
the central magic of the American governmental experience.
New York Times Editorial1
In the winter of 1998-99, I was in a graduate law program
designed for future law teachers. I found myself thinking with new
urgency about old questions: Can our legal system produce results
that are at least partly independent of political and economic power?
Or does the law always wind up reproducing and reinforcing the pow-
ers that be? In short, is there any such thing as the "rule of law"?
By a bizarre accident of timing, my personal inquiry into rule of
law issues coincided with a new popular interest in these matters
brought about by the Clinton impeachment hearings. Suddenly, there
were almost daily references in the news media and on the floor of
Congress to the sanctity and vulnerability of the rule of law in our
democracy. I was particularly struck by the quasi-religious tone that
prevailed.2 It seemed paradoxical to me that this most rationalist ideal
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1. Editorial, Fairness for Ken Starr, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1998, at D14.
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should generate an aura of the sacred, and the apparent contradiction
provoked me to look more closely at what we mean when we talk
about believing in something.
While considering what it meant to preach the rule of law as an
ungrounded article of faith, I began to wonder if there was anything
about the nature of legal practice that might ground a more limited
belief in law's ability to constrain power. Watching the impeachment
proceedings on television, I found myself thinking about an earlier
period in my life. I used to be an actress and a performance artist. It
occurred to me that there were certain similarities between legal and
theatrical practice.
Perhaps the formal conventions that radically limit behavior on
stage and in court might be related to the decisional constraints that
constitute a rule of law. That possibility, in turn, led me to ponder
various kinds of limits evoked by the figure of a blind, hence limited,
justice. In the end, the formalities of legal procedure seemed more
central to the value of a just legal system than I had previously
thought. Somehow, investigating my own tenuous-but apparently
unshakeable-belief in a rule of law ideal changed the way I saw legal
practice. This Article reports that investigation.
I. TEACHING AND BELIEVING
You may disagree with us, but we believe in something.
Rep. Henry J. Hyde
3
What would I say if my students asked me if I believed in the
rule of law? I could try a definitional dodge (always defensible as a
lesson in forensic technique): "Well," I might hedge, "that depends
on what you mean by 'rule of law."' I could stay on safe technical
ground by observing that problems brought to litigation are often
stated in terms of rules and that lawyers need to know how to make
and defend such statements. Or, I could go straight to the heart of the
matter, then out the other side, by articulating and then distancing
myself from the most improbable extreme version of the rule of law
ideal: "I certainly do not believe that law is a closed logical system
that functions entirely through the algorithmic application of politi-
cally neutral principles by purely rational, objective decisionmakers."
1(1984).
3. Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of President William
Jefferson Clinton [hereinafter Impeachment Trial of President Clinton], 106th Cong. 1416 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Hyde).
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But rhetorical strategies are unlikely to satisfy a student who really
wants to know if I think there is or can be such a thing as the rule of
law, "not of men. "
4
It is quite possible to study and even to practice law without
forming a clear opinion about whether law is capable only of embody-
ing and amplifying power, or if it can also restrain it, if not absolutely
then to some meaningful degree. Lawyers and law students face more
immediate problems about how law works. They must win the case,
do the assignment, pass the test, make the motion. If theoretical or
philosophical doubts and questions arise, there is nothing paralyzing
about not knowing where they stand. But it is hard to imagine teach-
ing something when you are uncertain about whether you believe in
that something's capacity to do what it is ostensibly meant to do.
A syllabus says something about what the teacher thinks law is
and can be. The question of what cases to include in a first-year torts
class-and of how to explain the courts' decisions in those cases-
quickly opens up the question whether it is likely, or even conceivable,
that "our law will rule. . . us, not the wishes of powerful individuals."5
A course plan may, or probably should, include materials that present
beliefs contrary to the teacher's views. It is hard to envision a success-
ful class taught so that no one has a clue as to what the teacher believes
about law's institutional effects, let alone one taught by someone who
does not know herself what she believes.
Maybe that is why for so long the most bitter controversies about
law's potential to restrain political power were not among lawyers,
statesmen, or social reformers, but among law teachers. In the 1930s,
the Realists stirred up the legal academe with their attacks on law's
claims to transcend political and economic pressures and the preju-
dices of legal decisionmakers. Though some of that skepticism
undoubtedly influenced the legal system through the attitudes of
Realist judges, explicit debate about the meaning and potential of the
"rule of law" remained firmly rooted in academia. Decades later, in
1984, Paul Carrington, then Dean of Duke University School of Law,
published a pithy attack on skeptical scholars who question law's insti-
tutional ability to transcend individual partiality and contending that
those intellectual "nihilists" had a duty to leave the training of young
lawyers up to true believers in the rule of law.6 The battle was joined
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
5. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989).
6. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227-28 (1984).
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by commentators of various political and scholarly stripes,7 but it
never made much noise outside the ivied halls of legal academe.
A. The Impeachment
That changed suddenly, and with a vengeance, when the im-
peachment trial of President Clinton made "rule of law" a household
phrase. It was tossed around and defended or dismissed by millions of
readers of the morning Times and watchers of the nightly news. With
passionate conviction and chant-like regularity, the House Managers
avowed that the President had violated the rule of law and that his
impeachment and conviction were required to vindicate it. In
response, the President's advocates argued first that the impeachment
itself was a violation of the rule of law (because its procedures fell
short of due process),8 then that impeachment had nothing to do with
the rule of law (which could only be enforced through an indictment
and judicial trial),9 and finally (when it seemed certain that the Presi-
dent would be acquitted by a wide margin), that the Senate proceed-
ings were a fine example of the rule of law in action.1"
How strange, just as I was coming to seriously puzzle over my
own position on the rule of law question, to hear the phrase repeated
in a hundred disjointed contexts, like the theme music in a bad movie.
In my more narcissistic moments, it occurred to me that I could have
dreamed the entire impeachment trial, conjured it as a kind of wild
dramaturgy of my personal intellectual dilemma: "Yes, doctor, it was
really weird. There was some kind of trial going on in this big room
7. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Peter Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic
Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Rep. J.C. Watt, House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee Hearing on the
Articles of President Clinton, 105th Cong. 1998 WL 854485 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler).
[Tihe rule of law says if you charge somebody with perjury, you are obligated to tell
them what the perjurious statements are... We have received sanctimonious lectures
from the other side of the aisle about the rule of law, but the law does not permit per-
jury to be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of one witness nor does the law
recognizes [sic] corroboration, the fact that the witness made the same statement to
several different people.
Id. As a matter of federal law, Rep. Nadler is simply wrong.
9. See Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra note 3, at 1271 (statement of Gregory
B. Craig, Office of the White House Counsel) (arguing that impeachment was meant to protect
the country from abuse of official power and the "criminal justice system was to vindicate the
rule of law.").
10. "The fact that we are having this trial in this chamber, the fact that we had an impeach-
ment proceeding in the House, is itself part of our rule of law. The president is immersed in the
application of the rule of law at this very moment." Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra
note 3, at 1448 (statement of Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President).
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with velvet curtains and all this dark wood paneling. And the judge
had these gold stripes on his robe, like a costume from some commu-
nity theater production of Gilbert & Sullivan. 1' Anyway, the prosecu-
tor gets up and says, 'he takes an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth,
nothing but the truth and lies, and then lies, and lies, and lies. What
kind of lesson is that for our kids and our grandkids? What does it do
to the rule of law?"12 The defense attorney was in a wheelchair. What
do you suppose that means? He rolls up to the mike and says, 'The
fact that we are having this trial in this chamber ... is itself part of our
rule of law. The President is immersed in the application of the rule
of law." 3 Yes, 'immersed,' that's interesting isn't it? As though law
was a kind of solvent that could produce ... what? Some sort of trans-
formation, I suppose."
B. Rule of Law Theories and Problems
You might think that the Clinton impeachment was not a likely
setting for a serious debate about the rule of law ideal. Perhaps the
rhetoric that accompanied that tawdry political spectacle should not be
compared to a principled theoretical discussion. But it strikes me that
the figures in my real-life dream sequence articulated two different
notions of the rule of law that correspond quite closely to divergent
theoretical versions of the concept as it is identified in the scholarly
commentary.'
4
The prosecutor, Henry Hyde, took what Margaret Radin calls a
"substantive" view of the rule of law,' 5 treating it as the institutional
embodiment of a moral system centered on fairness. The tricky thing
about this view is that it sometimes seems to confuse violating the law
with violating the rule of law. If President Clinton lied under oath, he
broke the law against perjury. But "rule of law" usually means more
than lawbreaking. Laws, after all, are made to be broken, and when
they are, the rule of law remains intact, as long as the legal violations
themselves are dealt with according to the law rather than decided by
the whims of whatever legal decisionmakers happen to be charged
11. American judges at all levels of the federal and state judiciary generally wear plain black
robes. A few years ago, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist had four gold chevrons sewn onto the
sleeves of his robe, apparently in imitation of a costume he had seen in a Gilbert and Sullivan
operetta. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACH-
MENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 168 (1999).
12. Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra note 3, at 1437 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
13. Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra note 3, at 1448 (statement of Charles F.C.
Ruff, Counsel to the President).
14. See Radin, supra note 5, at 783-84.
15. Id. at 787-88.
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with resolving the case. The most basic requirement in the "rule of
law not of man" is what Lon Fuller called "congruence between offi-
cial action and the law,' 1 6 i.e., resolving legal violations according to
the factors dictated by law rather than according to the political power
of the violator. Thus, a simple violation of the law does not a rule of
law issue make.
But hold on. President Clinton is not only a government official
but the chief official of law enforcement. If he breaks the law, isn't
that in and of itself a rule-of-law issue because it is so incongruous
with his official role? Certainly this theme was at the heart of the pro-
secutor's presentation in the Clinton case, a feeling that the problem of
how officials would respond to the violation of law in question was
doubled by the fact that the violation itself was committed by a gov-
ernment official in charge of enforcing the law.17 His rhetoric reflected
a moral intuition at the core of a substantive rule of law-officials are
supposed to follow the law.
If the Clinton administration was going to prosecute citizens for
perjury in civil suits, perjury by the head of that administration was
already a violation of the rule of law requirement of congruence
between law and official action. Moreover, the particular kind of vio-
lation charged-lying in a judicial proceeding-raised yet another
substantive rule of law problem because perjury itself potentially
undermines fairness in a legal system based on testimony. From this
point of view, letting the President off the impeachment hook would
be a triple blow to the substantive rule of law. Three times unfair.
The President's counsel, of course, had an interest in promoting
a view that the rule of law could escape unscathed by the President's
conduct and did not need to be redeemed by a conviction, so long as it
was preserved in the impeachment process. Unsurprisingly, then, his
remarks stressed what Radin calls an "instrumental" rule of law. 8
This version of the rule of law ideal is at once less and more ambitious
than a substantive approach. On the one hand, it makes no claim that
the rule of law necessarily produces a more moral outcome than would
otherwise result. On the other, it expresses a strong belief that the law
16. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1977).
17. Indeed, the impeachment process reflects this aspect of the problem by making removal
from office the punishment for official misbehavior, leaving open the possibility of civil and
criminal liability with additional penalties if the conduct at issue was illegal.
18. Radin, supra note 5, at 784. It is, of course, highly questionable whether the Presi-
dent's counsel would have been content to focus on the process rather than the result of the
impeachment if it had not appeared certain that the Senate would refuse to convict the President.
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itself-regardless of the character or motives of its practitioners-can
have a powerful positive effect on society.19
Ruffs metaphor of "immersion" evokes this second strong aspect
of the instrumental rule of law concept. It likens the impeachment
trial to an alien environment, different from our normal planetary
atmosphere. This is a world apart, where the ordinary political and
social pressures dissipate the way gravity lets go when you dive into a
pool. Presumably this separate legal medium would produce out-
comes not possible in the everyday world. And here the two views
begin to converge.
The prosecutor's substantive version of rule of law as fairness
depends to some extent on the idea that legal process is uniquely cap-
able of achieving fair results, otherwise it is an image of government
not by laws but by-extremely fairminded-men. At this point of
commonality, what are, for me, the central rule of law questions
return: Is there any reason to think that law has such an effect? Is
there any theory that explains why we might reasonably expect that
"immersion" in the impeachment trial, or for that matter, in any legal
proceeding, allows legal decisionmakers to escape-or even to ease-
the ordinary political, economic and personal pressures that shape the
rest of our behavior?
I agree with Robin West that what seems to be missing from
most liberal (and conservative) dreams of a legal system capable of
restraining political, economic, and charismatic power is some reason
to believe those dreams might come true.2" Calling for a "naturalistic"
theory that can support liberal intuitions about the viability of a rule
of law, West offers as an example Sigmund Freud's theory that law is
rooted in a primeval Oedipal murder and the murderers' subsequent
remorse. According to Freud, the rule of law begins when the patri-
cidal horde makes a collective decision to renounce aggression and
subject themselves to the authority of law as the totemic incarnation of
the murdered father. As West points out, Freud's explanation of
law's power to restrain human behavior has been widely discredited in
historical, psychological, and anthropological terms.21 Nevertheless,
Freud's approach remains in one sense more promising than the philo-
sophical defenses most contemporary legal scholars advance for the
19. Notice that in the claim for positive effect, the instrumental view merges with the sub-
stantive view of rule of law, just as the substantive view's emphasis on fair procedure is itself
dependent on an idea of instrumental good.
20. Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's
Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986).
21. Id. at 880-81.
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rule of law, because his argument is founded in a theory of "human
nature" with a factual basis.22
In the absence of a theory of how a rule of law might actually
work, plentiful examples of the legal system's failure to transcend
politics leave us necessarily suspicious about law's potential for shap-
ing human behavior. Given that we can generally explain legal out-
comes as the result of extralegal causes, what justifies anyone's faith in
the rule of law? West is right that what distinguishes Freud's theory
is its attempt to answer that question in arguable terms. Freud offers
a description of human tendencies and limitations that explains how a
rule of law ideal might be realized. Still, for most of us, that particular
description has been conclusively falsified. Is there another view that
can fill its place?
Like West, I find it deeply unsatisfying to be told that an auto-
nomous rule of law can somehow disempower ordinary social and
personal prejudices without being given any explanation of how such
transcendence is achieved. Nor is it particularly compelling to hear
that the rule of law must be a social reality because it is a social neces-
sity. As Jerome Frank remarked when his critics protested that society
could not do without the legal certainty he debunked, it would also be
useful to be in two places at once, "[b]ut although practical needs
prompt his desire for instantaneous transportation across the globe, it
can scarcely be said that, if Jones insists upon procuring a wishing-
rug, his demand is therefore practical in nature. '23 The fact that a
particular attribute is desirable in a legal system does not mean that it
is present, or even that it is theoretically possible.
Still, many law teachers seem satisfied to profess belief in the rule
of law as a kind of vocational prerequisite. When I showed a draft of
this Article to colleagues, some found my presentation of the problem
disingenuous. Surely I must believe in the rule of law, one of them
wrote, "figures in the law have no choice but to believe in a rule of
law; it is the fundamental source of all predictability, and the law rests
on predictability." For this man, the rule of law seems to be an axiom
whose objective reality is relatively insignificant because assuming its
existence allows for so many more interesting doctrinal inquiries, in
the same way the Euclidean assumption that parallel lines cannot
intersect opens up all the possibilities of triangulation. Questioning
such axioms is generally viewed as tedious and sophomoric, a gambit
by the uninitiated to be dismissed as quickly as possible in order to
move on to more sophisticated issues.
22. Id. at 819-20.
23. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 11-12, n.t (1930).
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At a law school panel discussion I attended during the impeach-
ment hearings, the faculty presenters opined that the President's
alleged conduct did not constitute impeachable offenses, even if he
had committed perjury and obstructed justice. A student raised her
hand. "What about the rule of law?" she asked. "If the President can
lie under oath and obstruct justice, what about everybody else?" "He
can be indicted and convicted just like anybody else," shot back one of
the panelists. Like ships that pass in the night.
The student's question, it seems to me, came from a substantive
view of the rule of law, like that expressed by Representative Hyde. It
focused on fairness and the inherent incongruity of the chief law
enforcement officer breaking the law and retaining his office.
Whether intentionally or obtusely, the professor parried, rather than
answered, the question by responding with an instrumental view that
went even further than Charles Ruff's avowed faith in the impeach-
ment process. In this view, the fact that the President was not legally
immune to prosecution at some later date was enough to satisfy the
criterion of congruence between official action and the law.24 But even
from a highly instrumental perspective, it seems questionable whether
that would really resolve the rule of law issue.
After all, impeachment is the process (legally) mandated by the
Constitution to address the wrongdoing of government officials. At
the very least, if the impeachment outcome was a totally foregone
political conclusion, we would have to acknowledge that the rule of
law had failed in that case-instrumentally as well as substantively.
The student's question was about how to square the notion of the rule
of law with a chief law enforcement officer who breaks the law. There
we were, sitting around a university talking every day about the legal
system as if it might produce better results than what we would get if
government officials did whatever they wanted. She was asking how
we could keep doing that if we were willing to write off the prescribed
constitutional sanction for official misconduct as having nothing to say
about the President's lies in a legal proceeding. That may not be a
very sophisticated rule of law question, but it is a profound one. Not
that I have an answer.
I imagine the student turning to me. "Do you believe in the rule
of law?" she asks. I imagine that I open my mouth and start to talk,
but no sound comes out. My mouth opens and closes, fishlike, and I
24. Though just about everyone agreed that Clinton could be prosecuted after leaving
office, it is not clear whether a sitting President is subject to indictment. Moreover, as Judge
Richard Posner has pointed out, it may well be that a President has the power to issue himself a
prospective pardon, rendering him de facto immune to criminal punishment, if not to conviction.
POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE supra note 11, at 105-08.
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move my hands in a pantomime of conviction as the look of curiosity
on the student's face turns to aversion. Silently, desperately, I repeat
the question over and over to myself, looking for a way in, a hook for
my fish mouth to grab at. The first thing that attracts me is the verb.
II. BELIEF MEANS DOUBT
If worse comes to worst, a doubter, even though by talking he
were to bring down all possible misfortune upon the world, is
much to be preferred to these miserable sweet-tooths who taste a
little of everything, and who would heal doubt without being
acquainted with it, and who are therefore usually the proximate
cause of it when doubt breaks out wildly, and with ungovernable
rage.
Soren Kierkegaard"
My imaginary interlocutor and the antagonists in the impeach-
ment case are not the only ones who have put the rule of law question
in terms of belief. Commentators across the political spectrum speak
of "belief in" the rule of law. Conservative Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy exhorted the American Bar Association: "If the
rule of law is to be preserved, we must restore and revive our belief in
its most simple, fundamental, principles."26 Liberal legal philosopher
Jeremy Waldron contends, "[t]hose who believe in the rule of law
need not believe that society and community are primarily legal struc-
tures."" And in her critical article, Robin West explains, "I will refer
to the belief in law's necessary morality and autonomy from politics as
a belief in the 'Rule of Law,' or a commitment to 'Rule-of-Law
virtues." 28
In some instances, of course, belief is simply used as a synonym
for knowledge, another way of expressing a proposition of fact about
some aspect of the world.29 It can also signal a purely normative state-
ment, meaning that one thinks something would be a good idea, such
as when someone says he believes in tax breaks for corporations, peace
on earth, or early toilet training.3" Often, though, "belief' carries
25. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING 120 (Walter Lowrie trans., 1969).
26. Anthony M. Kennedy, Law and Belief, 34 TRIAL, July 1998, at 22, 23.
27. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory, 2 RATIO JURIS. 79,
90 (1989).
28. West, supra note 20, at 818.
29. "Logic, then, is about beliefs and about when they are consistent with each other."
WILFRED HODGES, LOGIC 17 (1981).
30. But note that such statements generally imply the existence, or at least the possibility,
of the policies they advocate.
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another meaning, especially when we speak of believing in something.
That phrase suggests that something more is at stake than a cool pro-
postional position, something about the way the believer believes.
My friend Lucy's daughter, then seven years old, came home
from school one day and asked her mother whether she believed in
Jesus. Not wanting to squelch a newly awakened interest in spiritu-
ality but trying to avoid endorsing Christian orthodoxy, Lucy said
that she believed that a person named Jesus had once lived and done
some extraordinary things, but did not believe that he was the son of
God. "Yes, yes," said the frustrated first-grader, "but do you believe
in him?" As seven-year-olds apparently understand, belief in this
sense implies a kind of commitment. This sort of belief is a matter of
faith and generally entails a stronger connection between the believer
and the object of belief than is present in ordinary statements about
what one knows or thinks.
Notice, though, that if belief can imply this stronger tie between
the believer and what she believes, it may also suggest a more tenuous
connection. If I say that something is true and you say, "Are you
sure?" I might acknowledge doubt by responding, "Well, I believe
so. ,t31
Paradoxically, in matters of faith, both of these senses of belief
seem to be present at the same time. The pull between doubt and cer-
tainty at the center of belief awakens anxiety and a sense of drama.
Discussing her novel Tar Baby, Toni Morrison explains that the
book's opening sentence,
"He believed he was safe," is the second version of itself. The
first, "He thought he was safe," was discarded because
"thought" did not contain the doubt I wanted to plant in the
reader's mind about whether or not he really was-safe .... to
use "thought" seemed to undercut the faith of the character and
the distrust I wanted to suggest to the reader .... He believed;
was convinced. And although the word suggests his conviction,
it does not reassure the reader.32
Thinking about the rule of law in terms of one's belief in it in-
vokes the duality that Morrison consciously employed to heighten the
tension of her story. The move from thought to belief conjures up
both faith and doubt.
31. Cf. Wittgenstein's suggestion, "Suppose it were forbidden to say 'I know' and only
allowed to say 'I believe I know'?" (Wie wenn esverboten ware zu sagen 'Ich weiss' und erlaubt
nur zu sagen 'Ich glaube zu wissen'?) LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 366 at 47
(G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., 1972).
32. Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American
Literature, MICH. Q. REV., Winter 1989, at 29-30.
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Where there is belief, there is doubt or incomprehension-at
least from the perspective of anyone other than the believer, and
presumably for a believer disposed to reflect on his own beliefs. This
kind of belief can never be justified-nor can doubt be removed-by
rational argument, for, as Soren Kierkegaard observes, "faith begins
precisely there where thinking leaves off."33 Nor can faith, at least in
Kierkegaard's implacable terms, be anchored to universal moral val-
ues. As an act of faith, Abraham's murder of Isaac would not have
been justified by any greater good. That sort of ethical justification
belongs not to faith but to tragic heroism, such as when Agamemnon
sacrificed Iphegenia to free the Greek ships for war on Troy.3 4 Faith
has none of the comfort of moral justification available to heroes.
Because heroic acts appeal to universal principles, they are compre-
hensible to others. But acts of faith are private, unjustified, and
untranslatable.
Sometimes, those who speak in terms of faith in the rule of law
suggest that to act on that belief is heroic. Those appeals ring false
because real belief is its own justification and is thus necessarily unjus-
tifiable in external terms. As Kierkegaard says, "Humanly speaking,"
the person who acts on faith "is crazy and cannot make himself intel-
ligible to anyone. '"" In his plea to law teachers to keep faith with the
rule of law, Dean Carrington first used the language of belief: "The
law... is a mere hope that people who apply the lash of power will
seek to obey the law's command. Let us not be modest: it is an act of
considerable courage to maintain belief in such a hope."36 Ultimately,
though, he fell back on the idea of professional service as a greater
good to justify the faith he espoused and transform it into a moral
duty for all law professors:
[W]e love law not because reason requires it, but because our
commitment to our discipline serves the needs of the public to
whom, and for whom, we are responsible.
37
The reference to an external standard-professional duty-seems
meant to quell the doubt that would necessarily come with a true call
33. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 25, at 64. See also Wittgenstein, supra note 31, § 550, at 72,
stating "If someone believes something, we needn't always be able to answer the question 'why
he believes it;' but if he knows something then the question 'how does he know'? Must be capa-
ble of being answered." (Wenn Einer etwas glaubt, so muss man nicht immer die Frage
beantworten konnen, 'warum er es glaubt;' weiss er aber etwas, so muss die Frage 'Wie weiss er
es" beantwortet werden konnen.")
34. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 25, at 67-71.
35. Id. at 86.
36. Carrington, supra note 6, at 226.
37. Id. at 228.
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to act on faith. The implication is that by eschewing "nihilistic" crit-
icism and teaching rule of law doctrine, law professors will produce
more righteous and confident professionals who will, in turn, serve the
public as legal practitioners. But the value of that service depends on
the same belief in the rule of law that it supposedly justifies. We come
circling back to unfounded faith.
In the Clinton impeachment trial, Congressman Hyde blended
the language of faith with the rhetoric of public sacrifice:
The families of executed dissidents know that this is about the
rule of law, the great alternative to the lethal abuse of power by
the state.
Those yearning for freedom know this is about the rule of
law .... If they know this, can we not know it?
If across the river in Arlington Cemetery, there are American
heroes who died in defense of the rule of law, can we give less
than the full measure of our devotion to that great cause?
38
In fact, both sides in the impeachment trial managed to invoke
America's war dead. Opening for the defense, the President's counsel,
Charles Ruff, first declared that he was at a loss to respond to Repre-
sentative Hyde's evocation of two centuries of patriot martyrs, then
moved seamlessly into recalling his own father's landing on Omaha
Beach. Even in their shared hyperbolic exploitation of military hero-
ism, however, Hyde and Ruff managed to stick to their respective
substantive and procedural views of the rule of law. Whereas Hyde
exhorted a vote for impeachment, Ruff declined to argue that only the
specific legal outcome he was seeking would serve the same goals as
the sacrifices of wars past. Instead, he staked out a procedural high
ground: "as long as each of us-manager, president's counsel, sena-
tor-does his or her constitutional duty, those who fought for their
country will be proud."39
Proselytizing belief in the rule of law, Carrington, Hyde, and
Ruff all edge up to the precipice of faith, then pull back. Though they
speak in terms of acting on faith, they smuggle in moral justifications
for their demands: public service, democracy and freedom, honoring
the dead. But they do not really offer any moral reasons for the
actions they advocate. There is no reason to think the rule of law, or
acts based on it, would serve any of the values held out as justifications
38. Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra note 3, at 1193 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
39. Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra note 3, at 1224 (statement of Charles F.C.
Ruff, Counsel to President Clinton).
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for it-unless of course, you believe in the rule of law. Nor does the
invocation of moral values in any way explain how a rule of law might
overcome the existing social obstacles that prevent the full realization
of the values espoused.
III. FREE AGENCY AND STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM
The rallying cry of the faithful to judicial independence was that
independence from other men is the best guarantor of total and
scrupulous servitude to the law.
Robert Cover4"
The question of belief in the rule of law is, in a sense, a variation
of a larger question that these days haunts nearly every inquiry into
the social world and every argument for social change. In some ways,
the question at the turn of the millennium is the extent to which our
understanding of the world and our actions in it are determined by
structural forces outside our individual control-and even outside our
consciousness-and to what extent we make independent choices. In
practice, any concept of a rule of law must entail a rather complicated,
perhaps conflicting, combination of institutional determination and
individual agency.
The central rule of law notion is that law as an institution is
capable of determining answers to legal questions that are somehow
different from the decisions individual legal actors would come to if
left to their own devices. At the same time, the rule of law ultimately
depends on the willingness and capacity of independent legal actors
who interpret and apply law to resist the pressures and constraints of
other social institutions. In this sense, then, the rule of law is the rule
of man; it is the rule--or the dream-of the individual somehow tem-
porarily released from other institutionalized habits of mind that
would typically direct his judgment, free to submit, free to follow the
law-while ignoring all other social rules. It seems the most rigorous
rule of law requires the most unruly social actors.
When I mentioned this paradoxical situation to a lawyer friend,
he was nonplused. "Well, it's because of rationality, isn't it," he
suggested gently, looking at me as though he wondered how I had
managed to pass a single course in law school. Of course he is right as
far as it goes.
40. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 146 (1975).
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As Pierre Schlag puts it, in the traditional view, "[i]t is the possi-
bility of a publicly accessible and recognizable reason that enables
legal actors to claim that power, interest, prejudice, and personal pro-
clivities are constrained and controlled by an overarching frame known
as the rule of law." 4' The rule of law is supposed to be rational, and
rationality is about principled choice. So, if the law is rational, then
you have a whole legal system of independent individuals who can and
will reason out what the correct legal result is and follow it. But there
are some problems with this formula.
For one thing, as Schlag points out, the invocation of reason reit-
erates rather than answers the question of whether, and why, one
believes in a rule of law. Critics and philosophers inside and outside
the field of law have long questioned the possibility of the objective
reason to which law aspires. The critique of rationality is certainly the
most devastating line of attack on the whole rule of law ethos-espe-
cially in the form of skepticism about whether there is any such thing
as a rule that is logically prior to social practices. But this is an issue
that I will basically ignore for the rest of this Article. I think there is
another question that needs answering before we reach the lofty realm
of the possibility of some kind of objective or public reason.
Assuming for a moment that there was such a thing as "publicly
accessible and recognizable reason"" expressed, however imperfectly,
in the form of legal rules, it is not at all clear how such a store of rea-
son would constrain irrational prejudice, an aspect of human behavior
not generally known for its susceptibility to logic. To allow for the
possibility of a rule of law, then, do we not first need a theory of how
legal practice might at least help practitioners constrain the "interest,
prejudice, and personal proclivities"43 that would otherwise prevent
legal decisionmakers from applying reason's dictates?
To me, the traditional rule of law formulation-logical rules con-
strain human decisions-is cart before horse. It seems clear that,
behaviorally, anyway, constraint makes reason possible, rather than
vice versa."4 If that is so, belief in the rule of law-in any sense other
41. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 20 (1998).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Margaret Radin acknowledges this problem early on in her article on rule of law, saying
that "[i]mplicit in the understanding of law as rules, and of the Rule of Law as a guide to the
efficacy of those rules," is the problem of "the individual as rule-follower." Radin, supra note 5,
at 787. Thus, implicit in rule of law ideals is the notion that the people to whom the rules are
addressed must be responsive to them. She seems to be speaking primarily of the question of law
abidingness in general, but legal decisionmakers must also follow rules. Radin acknowledges that
'problems of choice and motivation" are therefore inherent in a concept of rule of law, but she
chooses instead to focus on the other major philosophical problem-the rationality critique-
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than as a good but utterly unachievable idea-requires some notion of
how legal practice disposes legal decisionmakers to separate them-
selves from other institutional and personal pressures and thus makes
it possible for them to follow the guidance of legal reasoning, assum-
ing there is such a thing.
In other words, as I see it, there are really two parts to the rule of
law idea: (1) restraint of ordinary individual decisionmaking, and (2)
direction toward an at least partially determined result. The usual
understanding of the rule of law is that the second part takes care of
the first; that somehow the rules themselves create the constraints. In
the traditional rule of law formulation, constraint is not seen as a sep-
arate attribute, but rather as the product of the reasoning process that
guides the substantive legal result. But why should that be so? I'm
suggesting that, behaviorally, constraint has to come first to enable
legal decisionmakers to follow reason's directions, to the extent ration-
ality is possible. Is there any feature of the legal system that seems a
likely facilitator of such constraint?
Perhaps oddly, my pre-law-school experience as an actress and
performance artist suggests a possibility. It seems to me that the
structured public performance of trial and appellate practice and the
communal reasoning "out loud" prescribed for juries and, to a lesser
extent, for appellate panels may function to move legal actors out of
their characteristic ways of thinking. In other settings, notably theat-
rical ones, people adopt formally structured processes that, by chang-
ing and limiting their ordinary ways of looking, speaking, and acting,
lead them to feel and think in uncharacteristic ways.
In the theater, enforcing certain limitations on speech and action
is a common strategy for opening a performer's mind and broadening
his range of habitual behavior. Performers know that by adopting
rigid patterns of speech and action they can temporarily disrupt their
own habitual ways of thinking and behaving. Thus, actors might
choose, for example, to play a scene using only a few set phrases and/
or a limited series of prescribed movements. For that matter, a play
script is a complex example of such a set of limitations. One goal of
such imposed external constraints on behavior is to ultimately release
internal, often unconscious, mental and behavioral inhibitions and
patterns that would otherwise prevent performers from fully realizing
different characters. Performing in groups and in public tends to
increase the effect of such exercises, probably because one's fellow
performers and the audience respond to one's uncharacteristic presen-
which I am ignoring here. Id.
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tation of self in ways that reflect the behavioral changes, reinforcing
their authenticity.
It may be that the enacted commitment to perform the dry
public rituals of the legal system has a similar capacity to interrupt the
habitual thought patterns of legal actors. Rather than a conscious
individual obedience to substantive legal rules, then, it may be their
effort to put themselves to the public and communal forms of legal
process that can ground our expectation that legal actors will transcend
their usual subjective biases.
It seems important that much adjudicative action is not under-
taken alone, but rather is performed in groups and often in public
settings. The quintessential example is the public trial. Unlike scien-
tists, trial judges only rarely reason alone in their rooms. Legal cases
begin in public with the filing of public documents, and may proceed
to the performance of advocacy before a public audience. Trial judges
make many of their most important decisions in public court, often on
the spot and in full view of parties and spectators, and through public
dialogue with the parties' legal representatives. In particular, nearly
all of the evidentiary decisions that get such great deference on appeal
are made in the midst of the trial process. When solitary study and
reasoning are a significant part of a legal decision, it eventually leads
back to a public explication of that reasoning process.
Appellate judges do at least some of their reasoning and decision-
making in groups. Panels of three or four are typical of intermediate
appellate courts, and courts of final decision such as the United States
Supreme Court have even more members. The Supreme Court does
not decide cases through the reasoning process of a single herculean
judge attempting to follow the rules, but through a communal public
process that includes formal argument and conferencing with all ninejustices.4 Though a single judge is usually assigned to write an appel-
late opinion, traditionally, at least, this takes place after a conference is
held in which the panel determines the majority's view of the correct
outcome. Again, traditionally, all appellate decisions are published,
along with explanatory reasoning, though this practice is changing.
Trial fact finding is done by juries of six to twelve. Their delib-
erative process is private in the sense that it is protected from the view
of the general public. But, if it is not a public performance, it is cer-
tainly a collective ritual. Typical jury instructions warn jurors not to
45. Thus, Ronald Dworkin's imaginary judge, Hercules, who has "superhuman intellectual
power and patience" is distinguished from real legal decisionmakers not only by his extraor-
dinary individual capacities but also by his solitude. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239
(1986).
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draw solitary conclusions about the case, not to talk with anyone
outside the jury, and not to talk with other jurors until the case has
been presented to them for the start of formal deliberations. These
instructions conflict with the usual tendency of people engaged in a
common project to speculate about the possible conclusions on their
own and to discuss them informally with family and friends and most
of all with the other people who are making the decision with them.
Against what seem to be both normal and rational ways of coming to a
decision, the court's instructions impose a limiting communal form on
the jury's reasoning process.
It is not at all clear how such formal communal practices advance
the rationality of legal decisions. In fact, it seems rather certain that
they do not do so directly. Perhaps, then, the performative forms of
adjudication are nothing but irrational formalism, "survivals" of a less
scientific age of jurisprudence that hang on through sheer inertia and
the legal system's conservative tendencies. But procedural formalism
may also have salutary potential. The enactment of restrictive trial
procedures may provide a behavioral constraint that-perhaps partly
through simple distraction-helps deprive legal decisionmakers of
their habitual ways of perceiving the world, leaving them open to a
different kind of reasoning process. To see things from a distinctively
"legal" point of view, decisionmakers first have to give up their usual
perspectives. The adoption of restrictive procedures for a trial's truth
finding function may facilitate that first step toward a uniquely legal
resolution of the issues being adjudicated, a result that begins by
further constricting the ordinary subjective approach of the individ-
uals who serve as legal decisionmakers in the case.
IV. TRANSCENDENT DISABILITY
She is blindfolded, for nothing but pure reason, not the often
misleading evidence of the senses, should be used in making
judgments.
Cesare Ripa46
Law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality.
Robert Cover47
46. BAROQUE AND Rococo PICTORIAL IMAGERY 120 (a sixteenth century encyclopedia
of iconography) (E. Maser ed., 1971) quoted in Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of
Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1748 (1987).
47. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604 (1986).
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The familiar image of blind Justice may provide a clue to the pri-
macy of constraint in our legal system. Justice's blindfold is generally
interpreted as symbolizing the notion that the law's application of
objective reason produces results untainted by subjective sympathies,
fears, likes, and dislikes. What strikes me, though, about the blind-
folded figure is its suggestion that the ideal of objective rationality can
only be achieved through a loss-through a limit that incapacitates as
it empowers. Rather than a celebration of the power of human reason
to overcome the limitations of individual perception and understand-
ing, the image presented is of justice achieved by disabling the
untrustworthy human agent. A blindfolded Justice seems to under-
mine the concept that independent reason itself can generate rule of
law constraints, that a legal decisionmaker freely chooses to follow the
law instead of some other path.
In the first place, the blindfold calls attention to the real problem
of constraint in any legal system. Real judges (and juries) are not
blindfolded, but depend very much on their perception to determine
the facts upon which "blind" Justice will operate.48 Even if, in theory,
the law is insensible to individual differences, in practice, the rule of
law depends on the administration of sighted, sensing individuals vul-
nerable to prejudice and error. Even taken on traditional terms, then,
the blindfolded figure stirs an uncomfortable doubt about the possibil-
ity of achieving the depicted goal. The contrast between the icono-
graphic ideal and real human practice could not be more stark."
48. One commentator notes that "[h]istorically, sight was viewed as critical to the jury
function of evaluating evidence and credibility." Nancy Lawler Dickhute, Jury Duty for the Blind
in the Time of Reasonable Accommodation: The ADA's Interface with a Litigant's Right to a Fair
Trial, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 866 (1999). Under the ADA, blind persons should prob-
ably not be routinely dismissed from jury duty, but challenges for cause and peremptory strikes
are possible. There are several sitting blind judges, including David S. Tatel on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Richard Casey on the Southern District of New
York. When Judge Casey was nominated to the trial bench, he faced serious questions about his
ability to do the job.
49. It also has to be said that a more literal interpretation of the image is far more nihilistic.
Why is that woman going around blindfolded with a sword in her hand? She'll put somebody's
eye out with that thing! And why a woman, after all? I suppose the conventional wisdom is that
because at the time the symbol was chosen women rarely occupied public positions of power, the
use of the female form conveyed an image of ideal justice, a spirit or idea, rather than any actual
person or role in the legal system. But, taking the image at face value, you would be tempted to
see the selection of a woman as an indication of the irrationality of the legal system. After all,
women's absence from public life was attributed to their lack of reason. Curtis and Resnik, supra
note 46, at 1756, point out that blindfolds do not always signify the objective distance of the
wearer; in fact, numerous medieval and renaissance images employ blindfolds to symbolize
foolishness, confusion, and inadequacy. In this light, what could be more dangerously mis-
guided than a blindfolded woman with a sword?
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It is not just at the practical level that the familiar blindfolded
figure of Justice challenges the rule of law. The image suggests that
even in ideal form, justice is not a matter of a free agent choosing con-
sciously between alternatives to find the just result. The restriction
imposed does not appear to allow an informed selection limited
through reason. If that were the message, we might see Justice with
her eyes open and her hands tied or perhaps controlled, like a puppet,
by some other clearly omniscient figure."0 On the contrary, the stand-
ard image of Justice portrays her as unable to discern any choices at
all. If Justice required a sharper view of reality, she might wear
glasses. Instead, it looks like what Lon Fuller calls "the enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules"5 depends on
relinquishing one's ordinary view of the conduct being judged. Far
from a rational comparison of conduct with rules, the act of applying
the rules seems to entail losing sight of the conduct. A blindfolded
Justice hardly celebrates the power of legal reasoning to sharpen one's
independent view of the world. Instead, it suggests a need to give up
that view altogether.
Iconographically, then, justice does not leave one's view of reality
intact; it changes, limits, even obliterates the way we would otherwise
view the world we judge. This is what anthropologist Mary Douglas
calls "institutional thinking" at its strongest.5 2 Douglas argues that all
social institutions develop in part by limiting the way people see real-
ity. Institutional "practices establish selective principles that highlight
some kinds of events and obscure others." '53 In the image of blind-
folded Justice, the sacrifice of ordinary, individual vision appears.
Doing justice is apparently disorienting, requiring a loss of one's usual
means of finding one's way in the world and acceptance of severe
50. In fact, the last image does exist in a famous medieval depiction of Justice. Ambrogio
Lorenzetti's fresco in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, known as the Allegory of Good Govern-
ment, features an open-eyed image of Justice, who, instead of holding scales, appears to be
connected through the top of her head to the center point of a giant balance held above her by the
figure of wisdom. The huge scales hang down on either side of Justice, and she holds a thumb
on each of the pans in which an angel sits. The angel to her right is cutting off one man's head
and bestowing a crown on another. In the left balance pan, the angel is offering a strongbox,
spear and staff to two gentlemen. Though Justice's eyes are open and unobstructed, they are
turned upward toward the controlling figure of Wisdom, who appears to be ultimately in charge
of the actions of the angels in the balance and the cord that emanates from the scales and is
passed by another allegorical figure, Concord, into the hands of a group of citizens. As one
commentator remarks, in this picture, Justice truly appears as "an emanation of divine wisdom."
CHIARA FRUGONI, PIETRO AND AMBROGIO LORENZETTI 70 (Lisa Pelletti trans., 1988). But
this is not the image of Justice that has become our modern icon.
51. FULLER, supra note 16, at 96 (1977).
52. MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK 124 (1986).
53. Id. at 70.
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limits on ordinary perception. This may be, as Douglas argues, a
common feature of all social institutions, but it seems rare, if not
unique, for an institution to flaunt that aspect of its function in a
personification that lacks a crucial perceptual faculty.
Still, there is a way to see this impaired figure as somehow en-
hanced by her limitations and ultimately transcendent. The character
driven to overcome ordinary human limits through the imposition of
an extraordinary handicap is a familiar cultural hero. Repeatedly we
hear of people who suffer some kind of incapacitating physical injury
or emotional blow that somehow forces them to go beyond what
would otherwise have been possible. In classical mythology, blindness
is associated with another extraordinary form of sight-second sight-
the ability to foresee, and, like Tiresias and Cassandra, to foretell the
future.
Blind seers have lost a central human attribute but gained a
superhuman power: they are transcendent truth-tellers.5 4 The idea
may be that by taking away the natural human ability you also take
away the human limit. The blind figure of Justice identifies law with
these other mythological figures for whom the loss of ordinary sight
leads to extraordinary powers of vision and prophecy, "the projection
of an imagined future upon reality.""
I find the notion of power acquired through disability deeply
attractive. I am fascinated by the image of Justice putting on her
blindfold in a bid for transcendence, disabling herself in one way in
order to gain another sort of power, a power that exceeds ordinary
human limits--extraordinary capacity achieved through deliberate
limitation. Or was it deliberate?
The figure of blind Justice makes me think of another situation
in which disabilities are transformed into extraordinary powers. The
anthropologist Victor Turner writes about the "rituals of affliction"
among the African Ndembu."6 These ceremonies aim at freeing
sufferers of various forms of misfortune-for instance bad luck in
hunting or reproductive problems-from the spirits causing their dis-
orders.5 7 In the Ndembu system, the person cured of her handicap
becomes exceptionally gifted in the previously afflicted area. More-
over, according to Turner, when an afflicted person has undergone a
successful ritual cure, she is entitled to become a minor ritual healer
54. Tiresias appears, for example, in Aeschylus' Oedipus at Colonus, where he informs
Oedipus that Oedipus himself is the killer he is seeking. Cassandra foresaw the sack of Troy.
55. Cover, supra note 47, at 1604.
56. VICTOR WITTER TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RIT-
UAL 9 (1967).
57. Id. at 9-12.
2001]
Seattle University Law Review
herself, and may even progress to taking on the role of a principal
healer."8 Thus, the way toward acquiring the power to heal affliction
begins by being afflicted.
In the iconography of justice, the blindfold may be at once a
symbol of the problem to be solved-justice hampered by prejudice,
by partiality, by received wisdom-and a symbol of the power to cure
that very defect. Is it too farfetched to see contemporary trials on
some level as rituals of affliction--ceremonies performed to cure the
handicap of subjectivity? From this perspective, in law as in the
Ndembu tradition, both the cure and the power to cure begin with an
amplification of the problem. Extraordinary success at hunting begins
with exceptionally bad luck in the field. In law, the transcendence of
an individual's subjective point of view begins by narrowing the
available perspectives through the formalities of rigid legal procedures.
Of course, the idea of breaking through existing limits by impos-
ing additional ones is not confined to classical mythology, law, and
tribal religion. I have already said that performers sometimes use self-
limiting techniques to go beyond habitual behavioral patterns and
expand their artistic range. Related concepts are certainly present in
Western visual art. Some abstract painting, for instance, relies on a
kind of deliberately assumed disability. The painter says, "Since my
ability to represent reality betrays me, let me give it up. Instead of
trying to paint the world, I will paint paintings. Instead of trying to
overcome the limits of the human ability to translate nature into paint,
I will restrict myself to two-dimensional forms or gestures with paint
and see what results."
The Cubists foreswore their painterly power to create a unity of
aspect through naturalistic perspective. This was a sacrifice of a
technique previously thought to be the greatest achievement of West-
ern art. Instead of trying to advance that achievement, the Cubists
gave it up and set themselves to reproducing the fractured, partial
aspects of three-dimensional objects translated to a single flat surface.
It is at least arguable that the limitations of the Cubist process freed
Picasso to produce the greatest paintings of his career. 9
I am thinking also of Jackson Pollock, whose famous poured and
dripped paintings may appear anarchic but were actually produced
58. Id. at 10.
59. The art critic John Berger points out that Picasso's Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, generally
considered to be the first Cubist painting, "unlike any previous painting by Picasso, offers no
evidence of skill." JOHN BERGER, THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF PICASSO 73 (1989). Yet,
somehow, the loss of his previous painterly power led to a new freedom: "It is as though with
the disappearance of his prodigious skill Picasso was no longer isolated, no longer bound to his
past, but open to the free interchange of ideas." Id. at 74.
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through rigorous self-limitation. Confining himself to throwing, drip-
ping, and spattering paint, Pollock consciously abandoned the skills he
had developed in decades of work. Limiting the exercise of his expres-
sive powers led him to break through the previous limits of painterly
expression. He produced some of the most important art works of the
twentieth century. Notwithstanding their rebellious image, Pollock
and the "process artists" who followed his example are perhaps the
most rigorous rule followers, the most legalistic of innovators for
whom formal procedure is the key to pushing past the limits of indi-
vidual creative efforts.
Just as performers and abstract painters engage in limiting prac-
tices to expand their creative range and develop characters and visual
effects they would otherwise find unimaginable, it may be that the
adoption of restrictive, highly-structured public modes of argument
and decisionmaking intervenes in legal actors' normal perceptual and
intelectual habits. Like artists, legal decision-makers employ self-
limitation to achieve unexpected and unpredictable results, i.e., results
that are not entirely dictated by their ordinary individual outlooks.6"
The blindfolded figure of Justice stirs a nagging doubt about the
very transcendence it seems to embody: perhaps a handicap that
enables one to exceed ordinary limits is still a handicap. A remarkable
early image of Justice acquiring her blindfold makes explicit this una-
voidable dark side of the image. Apparently, Justice was not always
blindfolded.6' A few modem incarnations of a sighted Justice remain,
and up until the late fifteenth century, she seems to have gazed clear-
eyed onto the world she judged. A 1494 woodcut by Sebastian Brant
depicts the transformation. In it, Justice is seated, her scales drooping
toward the floor, while a fool in a horned cap binds her eyes from
behind.62 One commentator suggests that this image, which was
reproduced throughout Europe, may have been the source of the even-
tually ubiquitous figure of blindfolded Justice.63 That seems difficult
60. I am not the first to see Justice's blindfold as a metaphor of the procedural constraint
necessary for, and imposed by, our legal system. For Robert Cover, "Procedure is the blindfold
of Justice." Curtis & Resnik, supra note 46, at 1728. Instead of the formality of procedure,
Cover saw in the blindfold the "indirectness" inherent in a procedural system of justice, the
"purposeful interposition of a makeshift screen between reality and decision, an interposition
which obstructs direct knowledge." Id. Cover also noticed that the blindfolded figure of Justice
preserves a sense of loss. He suggested that legal decisionmakers "of quality" would feel the urge
to peek out from under the blindfold, not in order to cheat, but to satisfy the worthy desire to
"overcome the elusiveness of indirection." Id.
61. MARTIN JAY, Must Justice Be Blind?, in LAW AND THE IMAGE 19 (Costas Douzinas &
Lynda Nead eds., 1999).
62. Id. at 19 and Fig. 1.3.
63. Id. at 19-20. Other possible explanations for the development of the blindfolded icon
include the Renaissance recovery of the writings of Plutarch, which recorded a depiction of the
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to prove, and I am skeptical of attributing so widespread a change to a
single image. The more important point for me is that the image
reveals the defective aspect of a blindfolded Justice. It is difficult to
see a fool covering Justice's eyes as an unqualified improvement of
normal sensibilities. Justice in this picture has a real problem; she is
being tricked or deceived or is acquiescing to a foolish way of going
about things. Here, the transcendent figure whose handicap is the
symbol or source of her greatest strength appears a misguided dupe
who has lost or given up the perceptual faculty necessary for inde-
pendent, willful judgment. This Justice will have to be led and may
be led by a fool. A handicap that leads to some kind of transcendence
begins as a real handicap and remains one, at least for certain
purposes.
Whatever new perspectives the performed formalities of legal
procedure may enable will come at the cost of the perceptual capacities
we usually rely on for moral and practical judgments. All the talk
during the impeachment trial about faith in the rule of law missed this
point.
It might be "morally permissible," as Representative Hyde sug-
gested, "when, with the gravest matters of national interest at stake, a
President could shade the truth in order to serve the common good."64
But it certainly would be no less a violation of the rule of law than per-
jury to cover up an extramarital affair. Moreover, it is easy to say
someone should be punished for breaking the rules when following
them would have made things hard for him, as in Clinton's case. The
hard rule of law question is whether we are prepared to support some-
one following the rules when they seem-to those of us who are not
blindfolded-to lead to a moral horror show. Back when we had
slavery in this country, avowed rule of law believers enforced it, and it
was not a change in law that eventually ended the 'peculiar institu-
blind chief judge of Thebes, or a developing rationalist distrust of images and the faculty through
which images are perceived. Curtis & Resnick, supra note 46, at 1756; Jay, supra note 61, at 20-
21. Then again, the sightless icon may serve to distinguish justice from rationalist modes of
thought. Michel Foucault has argued that at the turn of the sixteenth century, a general shift
occurred from a model of knowledge that stressed logical deduction from first principles and
textual interpretation to an outward-turning process of observation and discovery. "[Tlhere
appeared a will to know which, anticipating its actual contents, sketched out schemas of possible,
observable, measurable, classifiable objects: a will to know which imposed on the knowing
subject, and in some sense prior to all experience, a certain position, a certain gaze and a certain
function (to see rather than to read, to verify rather than to make commentaries on)." MICHEL
FOUCAULT, The Order of Discourse, in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION 112 (P. Bizzell & B.
Herzberg eds., 1990). Without a doubt, seeing is the privileged sense of modem science. It is
curious, then, that at the "dawn" of the age of scientific "enlightenment," Justice's eyes were
bound.
64. Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, supra note 3, at 1191 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
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tion.' For that we had to have a war. On the other hand, this kind of
problematic moral result makes the rule of law appear a more realistic
possibility. Without that sort of trade-off, it looks too much like a
fairy tale that is simply too good to be true.
V. BELIEF AND PRACTICE
[T]o transform the leap of life into a walk, absolutely to express




The hardest rule of law question of all, it seems to me, is how
real legal practice shapes and is shaped by various forms of power in
our society. Here, both proselytizers and skeptics of the rule of law
fail to provide useful answers.
The unquestioning believer's dichotomy is a social world that
somehow always gets the law it needs, the nonbeliever's is a political
power struggle masked by a legal system. Both ignore the complicated
ethical, political, psychological, and analytical problems inherent in
law as a social practice. If political power works through the law, how
is that different than if it works through some other mechanism?
To say that one must choose between believing in a rule of law
that is either completely independent of or indistinguishable from
political power is to ignore the way law functions in relation to power
and as a complicated form of power. It would be as if in order to
understand language, I asked only whether you believed your thoughts
existed before you put them into words and never bothered to ask how
putting thoughts into words might both reflect and transform a
speaker's thoughts and the reality in which the words are spoken.
Both unquestioning believers' and critics' accounts of the rule of law
generally conceive a relationship between society and law that looks
like another version of Descartes' mind/body problem. Society and
the law are radically separate, but somehow mysteriously joined.66
65. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 25, at 52.
66. Another way to see the nonbeliever's side is as a mechanistic, monistic response to the
dualism of believers. In response to Cartesian dualism, some say that there is no such thing as
"mind" distinct from physical structures and processes-that all thought, and therefore all mean-
ing, can be reduced to and explained in terms of firing neurons and interacting chemicals. How-
ever, even if that is the case, it hardly justifies a lack of interest in the structures of human
thought. Thought, as a system, has remarkable effects on reality. Likewise, law as a system has a
major impact on society. Maybe the ultimate cause of those mental and legal effects is chemistry
or power, but that does not make the effects uninteresting or insignificant.
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Implicitly, society has priority. When society, or some part of it,
needs something, the law comes up with it.
In the believers' version of this dichotomy, the social demand the
law fills is universal, something like "the growth of complex economic
structures required the development of a flexible law of contract." For
nonbelievers, the rule of law serves the needs of dominant classes or
interest groups in the society, reinforcing existing or emerging power
structures and legitimizing those structures as natural, reasonable, and
just. Both believers and skeptics see the law as a tool: the prior social
world, or some part of it, generates needs or demands, and the law
responds or with justice or coercive control. The social mind calls and
the legal body answers.
Robert Gordon has described this fundamental similarity be-
tween critical and mainstream views of law. Gordon astutely points
out that this is the sort of functionalist approach that was abandoned
long ago by sociologists. 67 Still, it persists in the legal literature. As
Gordon and others have argued, the core distinction between law and
society is virtually impossible to maintain.
What sort of 'basic' practices in our society can we find that are
not partly constituted by law?6" Our family relationships, status at
work, connections to our homes, and the landscape all around us are
all created, in part, by legal structures. Just as the nature of conscious-
ness seems to have more to do with our existence as embodied crea-
tures than Cartesian dualism would allow, our social 'needs' are
created by law as well as filled by it. Even Descartes recognized there
were problems with the one-way model: "I am not present in my
body merely as a pilot is present in a ship," he conceded.
' 69
I have suggested that formal legal procedures may limit the
behavior of legal decisionmakers in ways that could be seen as an
embodiment of the rule of law. That view takes rule of law constraints
to be a kind of social practice that can be analyzed the same way we
study other forms of individual and institutional behaviors and prac-
tices. The limitation of this approach is that while it offers a natural-
istic, or behavioral, theory of rule of law constraints, it does not
67. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
68. Id. at 103-04. See also E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF
THE BLACK ACT 261 (1975): "How can we distinguish between the activity of farming or of
quarrying and the rights to this strip of land or to that quarry? The farmer or forester in his daily
occupation was moving within visible or invisible structures of law."
69. RENE DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy, Sixth Meditation, in DESCARTES:
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 117 (Elizabeth Anscombe & Peter Thomas Geach trans. & eds.,
1971).
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provide any support for the belief that those constraints necessarily
produce predictable substantive results.
Critics of the rule of law ideal have argued convincingly that it is
impossible to predict the outcomes of legal cases based on legal rules.
First, it is often impossible to identify a single controlling rule. Typi-
cally, all sorts of rules and principles apply to any given case, many of
which conflict. Even when there is a consensus on which rules con-
trol, once they are brought to bear on the particular facts, the neces-
sary gap between general rules and principles and the particular
situation at issue leaves plenty of room for subjective interpretation.
Perhaps, as I have proposed, the constraining value of legal rules
comes partly from their enacted procedural ritual and does not depend
on their uniform interpretation, but on a determined effort by practi-
tioners to follow the rules as they understand them, thereby limiting
their own speech and actions. This still leaves a gaping question,
though, about what determines the substantive result of legal proceed-
ings. If the critics are right about the level of indeterminacy in the
application of legal rules and in language itself, then procedures that
help decisionmakers transcend personal biases still will not result in
any necessary commonality between one decision and the next. At
best, the formal rituals may help legal decisionmakers withstand pres-
sures that might otherwise prevent just decisions. The basis of the
rule of law's ability to produce just or uniform results is left to be
explained.
Still, incomplete as it is, the idea that the restrictions of formal
public legal process may contribute to rule of law constraints could
help us understand more about how some aspects of our legal system
actually function to support or undermine a rule of law. For instance,
the notion that legal ceremonies may help legal decisionmakers sub-
vert their own subjective prejudices raises some practical questions
about a current trend in judicial practice. An increasing number of
federal appeals do not receive oral argument or formal published
opinions.
More than half of all federal appeals are now decided on the basis
of the papers filed alone, and three out of four decisions do not get full
published opinions (up from forty-five percent in 1985).70 Most of the
concerns expressed about these developments have focused on the lack
of full-fledged written opinions.7  Some observers of-and partici-
pants in-the judicial system contend that carelessness creeps in when
70. William Glaberson, Caseload Forcing Two-Level System for U.S. Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1999, at Al.
71. Id.
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decisions are issued without "all the pomp and circumstance," as
Judge Patricia Wald calls it, required for publication in the Federal
Reporter.7 2 My intuition that the performed formalities of traditional
judicial process may help produce a legal perspective that diverges
from a judge's ordinary subjective point of view suggests that we
ought also to be concerned about the loss of live appellate arguments.
Perhaps by skipping formal argument in open court, we are jet-
tisoning a practice that helps judges to do justice, behaviorally as well
as substantively. That does not mean that other concerns, such as
rising case loads, would not still dictate a need to cut argument in
some cases. But the behavioral aspect of formal public argument
might be considered in deciding which cases are argued. Maybe suits
that raise social issues about which we recognize there are many pre-
conceptions, or suits that are filed by individuals often denigrated in
society-prisoners, people on welfare-should be set down for argu-
ment time, rather than reserving argument primarily for cases that
raise knotty technical legal problems.
Finally, it strikes me that the lack of the performed limitations of
formal procedure was part of what ultimately kept the Clinton
impeachment trial outside the rule of law realm. Of course, the
impeachment was in one sense a highly formal affair, conducted with
great ceremony. The crucial ingredient for the sort of behavioral con-
straint I am suggesting legal procedures may provide, however, is the
adoption of formal limits in advance of the legal proceeding to be
performed. Though atmospherically ceremonial, the impeachment
process had fewer predetermined procedural limits than most court
proceedings. Because it lacked formal rules regarding the order of
proceeding, whether or not to hear live testimony, whether the adjudi-
cating Senators should abstain from contact with the parties outside
the trial, the Senate improvised.
It is certainly questionable whether procedural formality could
have fostered objectivity in a case so fraught with political pressures.
This was a polarized, partisan situation in which the decisionmakers
were officially affiliated with the parties. Still, the confluence of the
lack of preset formal directions and the obvious partisanship was strik-
ing. In the end, neither side saw their articulated version of the rule of
law fulfilled. The prosecutors failed to achieve the conviction that
they contended was necessary to restore the substantive rule of law.
72. Id. at A26. "Most judges, myself included, are not nearly as careful in dealing with
unpublished decisions," said Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit. Id. See also Thomas E.
Baker, The Ninth Circuit: To Split or Not to Split? 45 FEDERAL LAWYER 30, 31 (1998).
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The President's lawyers walked through a proceeding that almost no
one thought embodied procedural rule of law virtues.
At least one critic of the impeachment trial expressed his distaste
in part by likening it to a theatrical performance. Judge Richard Pos-
ner, for whom the Senate trial was "a parody of legal justice,"73 begins
his book on the impeachment with a list of "Dramatis Personae."74 It
is easy to see why theatrical metaphors spring to mind when a writer
wants to emphasize the spectacular and illusionist nature of an event.
But, for me, the impeachment trial lacked the attribute of theatrical
practice most significant in the performance of legal proceedings: the
existence of rigorous formal constraints. To that extent, it was a most
antitheatrical judicial event. 5  So, as it turned out, the case that
brought the rule of law ideal into the public spotlight demonstrated
little of the commitment to formal process that may facilitate a legal
system's ability to move decisionmakers out of their habitual political
perspectives. Where the formal practices that could support it were
absent, "belief in" the rule of law did not count for much.
VI. UNREASONABLE BELIEF
My inquiring student's eyes must surely have glazed over long
ago, and I still have not answered her question. Do I believe in the
rule of law? It must be clear by now what attracts me about the con-
cept: It is a shameless search for transcendence. Do I have doubts?
You bet. I am enough of a skeptic to squirm at taking the dream on
faith. So, I go hunting for some hint of rule of law constraints in real
live legal practice. Perhaps as pure wish fulfillment, I find the promise
of such constraints in the formal legal procedures that remind me of
the self-limiting-and self-transcending-techniques performers and
painters use.
But is that really why I believe? No. Like all believers, even
skeptical ones, I suppose I believe because of what I would lose if I
stopped believing. The notion that I cannot bring myself to give up is
the possibility of doing something better with a rule of law than I
could do without it. So, absurdly, indefensibly, self-aggrandizingly, I
73. POSNER, supra note 11, at 1-2.
74. Id. at vii-viii. See also the title of a news story reporting on the distribution of the fur-
niture and objects used in the trial that speaks of "Impeachment's Props." Impeachment's Props
Become Stuff of History, N.Y. TIMES, August 26, 1999, at A14.
75. Milner Ball wrote an article about trials as theater that includes a short section in which
he argues, on slightly different lines than I have here, that the theatrical nature of justice is to be
embraced as encouraging impartiality. As Ball sees it, acting the part of unprejudiced decision-
makers helps judges and juries to rise to the level of the objective characters they portray.
MILNER BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 59 (1981).
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do believe in the rule of law. Certainly not because "reason requires
it,"76 and not because of any willingness to sacrifice my own interests
to an ideal of public service or a universal moral order for which men
fought and died. I believe in the rule of law because I cannot bear to
give up on its dream of self-transcendence.
76. Carrington, supra note 6, at 228.
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